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Brown v. United States, The Paquete Habana,
and the Executive
MICHELLE AKERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the United
States has witnessed a tremendous expansion of executive power,
prompted mainly by perceived threats to our national security, as in the
current War on Terrorism, and threats to our position as a world
superpower, as in the Cold War.' The actions of the Executive during the
ongoing War on Terrorism illustrate the vastness of modern executive
power in international and military matters. Members of the executive
have drawn upon a variety of sources, including nineteenth and twentieth
century wartime cases, to support expansive executive authority,
including the authority to violate customary international law. This Note
examines one of the nineteenth century wartime cases relied upon by the
Executive, Brown v. United States,2 and argues that the Executive's
reliance on this particular case is unfounded. Not only does Brown date
back to an era when the Executive enjoyed far less power in
international and military matters, contemporary executive officials have
also relied upon a misinterpretation of the language in Brown, a
misinterpretation that originated in the landmark case The Paquete
Habana.3
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2009. The Author
gratefully acknowledges the valuable guidance provided by Professors William S. Dodge and Reuel
Schiller.
i. See, e.g., David S. Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances- The Claim of an
Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 213, 214-16 (1983); J. William Fulbright,
American Foreign Policy in the 2oth Century Under an i8th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1,
1-7 (1961) ("[W]e must give the Executive a measure of power in the conduct of our foreign affairs
that we have hitherto jealously withheld.").
2. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 11o (1814).
3. 175 U.S. 677 (19oo).
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The Paquete Habana crystallized customary international law as a
powerful limit on executive power by firmly establishing customary
international law as part of the laws of the United States.' The Paquete
Court relied on customary international law to invalidate executive
action, and thus not only established that customary international law "is
part of our law,"' but also that the Executive branch is bound by
customary international law.6
However, the opinion in The Paquete Habana was far from
watertight. Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, with which the majority
partially agreed, was the first Supreme Court opinion to interpret Brown,
an earlier wartime case, as supporting the Executive's authority to
violate customary international law. Both the majority and the dissent
agreed that Brown contained language that "might seem inconsistent"'
with the holding in The Paquete Habana." The portion of Brown that
troubled both the majority and the dissent reads:
This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will. The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of
wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it
cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be
disregarded.
The rule is, in its nature, flexible. It is subject to infinite
modification. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on
political considerations which may continually vary.9
Chief Justice Fuller's dissenting opinion in The Paquete Habana
interpreted the above passage from Brown to mean that the Executive,
as the "sovereign," could violate customary international law, the
"usage," at will.'" Justice Gray, writing for the majority, conceded that
this language from Brown seemed inconsistent with the Paquete Court's
application of customary international law to the Executive, but pointed
out that the Court's holding in Brown, invalidating executive
confiscation, supported the holding in The Paquete Habana."
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent from The Paquete Habana, which relies
heavily on Brown, 2 and Justice Gray's majority opinion, which conceded
4. Id. at 700 ("luternational [sic] law is part of our law."); see BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 835 (8th
ed. 2004) (defining "customary international law" as "[i]nternational law that derives from the practice
of states and is accepted by them as legally binding").
5. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
6. Id. at 700-01.
7. Id. at 710.
8. ld. (majority opinion); id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
9. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814).
io. The Paquete Habana, I75 U.S. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) at 128) (internal quotation marks omitted).
ii. Id. at 71o-1i.
12. Id. at 715-16 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
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inconsistencies between The Paquete Habana and Brown,'3 thus injected
vulnerability into The Paquete Habana at the time of its inception. This
Note proposes that this vulnerability is based on a misreading of Brown. 4
Both Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Gray misunderstood Brown. When
Chief Justice Marshall, the author of the Brown majority opinion, wrote,
"[t]his usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will" he was not asserting that the Executive could violate customary
international law at will. 5 Chief Justice Marshall was actually asserting
that when customary international law gives the "sovereign," by which
he meant Congress, the right to act, it is up to the Congress to decide
whether to act. 6 In essence, this passage from Brown states a proposition
analogous to prosecutorial discretion; although a law may give a
prosecutor the right to act, i.e. to prosecute, the prosecutor must exercise
discretion and choose to prosecute for the law to apply to a given
offender. The law does not operate ex proprio vigore.
Has the Paquete Court's misinterpretation of Brown really been of
consequence? One could argue that despite the majority and dissent's
misinterpretation of Brown, The Paquete Habana has nevertheless
served as a bulwark against executive carte blanche in international
matters. The portions of The Paquete Habana opinion discussing the
seemingly inconsistent language in Brown went largely unnoticed.
However, today, members of the Executive are relying on the same
misinterpretation of Brown, a misinterpretation that originated in The
Paquete Habana, to support further expansion of executive power. Since
the beginning of the War on Terrorism, several briefs filed in federal
court arguing for expansive executive power have echoed Chief Justice
Fuller's dissent in The Paquete Habana, adopting his misinterpretation of
Brown.7 Furthermore, several memos generated by the Executive have
also echoed Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown.'8 The
more legitimacy courts and practitioners give to this mistaken
interpretation, the less effective cases such as The Paquete Habana
become as a limit on executive power. What started as a snag in the
13. Id. at 710-It.
14. See William S. Dodge, The Paquete Habana: Customary International Law as Part of Our
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 175, 187 (John E. Noyes et al. eds., 2007).
15. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128.
16. See id.
17. Brief of Petitioner at 42-43, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339); Brief
for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 34-36, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
I8. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Couns. to the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns., Dep't of Def. (June 22, 2002) (on file
with The Hastings Law Journal); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., &
Robert J. Delahunty, Spec. Couns., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns., Dep't
of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
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analytical fabric of The Paquete Habana could end up rendering it an
impotent limitation on executive power.
Part I of this Note provides a summary of the facts of The Paquete
Habana and Brown, as well as an overview of the majority and minority
analyses in both cases. Part II explains how Chief Justice Fuller's
interpretation of Brown in his dissent from The Paquete Habana was
actually a misinterpretation and misapplication of Brown and provides
evidence illustrating that his interpretation of Brown was indeed
mistaken. Part II also discusses how Justice Gray, writing for the majority
in The Paquete Habana, shared Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation
of Brown and how that misinterpretation undermined the majority
opinion in The Paquete Habana. Part III draws upon historical
information about Chief Justice Marshall, the author of the majority
opinion in Brown, as further evidence that Brown did not advocate
executive carte blanche to violate customary international law. Part IV
demonstrates that although Brown and The Paquete Habana may be
antiquated cases, several contemporary briefs, cases, and executive
memoranda arguing for expansive executive power in the War on
Terrorism echo Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown.
I. THE PAQUETE HABANA AND BROWN V. UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW
A. THE PAQUETE HABANA
The Paquete Habana occurred against the backdrop of the Spanish-
American War.'9 On March 25, 1898, the Paquete Habana, a Spanish
fishing boat, sailed from Havana, Cuba."0 Her destination was a reef at
the western end of the island, still within the territorial waters of Spain."
The Paquete Habana remained at the reef for twenty-five days of
fishing.2
On April i9, 1898, while the Paquete Habana was still fishing the
reef, the United States declared war on Spain, and the Spanish-American
War began. 3 President McKinley commanded the North Atlantic
Squadron to blockade the north coast of Cuba.' After the declaration of
war, President McKinley issued an additional proclamation that the war
"should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views
of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice." 5 An admiral
implementing the blockade recommended to the Secretary of the Navy
19. 175 U.S. 677,712-14 (1900).
20. Id. 678-79.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, Chronology of the Spanish American War,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/chronology.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712.
25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that Cuban fishing crews should be detained to prevent them from aiding
the enemy.26 In response to this recommendation, the Secretary of the
Navy guardedly stated, "any such vessel or crew considered likely to aid
enemy [sic] may be detained." 7 Approximately a week later, as the
Paquete Habana made her way back to Havana, the Castine, a United
States gunboat, captured her as a prize of war."'
The captors brought the Paquete Habana, along with another
Spanish vessel, the Lola, to Key West and filed a libel for the
condemnation of the vessels and their cargo as prizes of war.29 The
captains of the two vessels filed claims alleging that the United States
unlawfully confiscated the vessels." However, their claims were
unsuccessful, and the Paquete Habana and the Lola were condemned
and sold at auction.' The owners of the Paquete Habana and the Lola
appealed the condemnation of their vessels to the United States Supreme
Court.32
After disposing of the United States' argument that the Court lacked
jurisdiction, Justice Gray, writing for the majority, turned to the question
of whether the Castine legally captured the Paquete Habana and the
Lola as prizes of war.33 The Court immediately turned to customary
international law to address this question.34 The Court began by
surveying the practices of "civilized nations" including England, France,
Holland, Prussia, and the United States, over the preceding 300 years.
After its survey of international practices the Court concluded that the
consistent practice among states was to exempt coastal fishing vessels
from capture. 6
The Court went on to review the works of jurists for "trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is."37 Relying upon the works of De
Cussy, Calvo, De Boeck, and Fiore, among others, the Court concluded,
"the vessels of fishermen have been generally declared exempt from
confiscation, because of the eminently peaceful object of their humble
industry, and of the principles of equity and humanity."' 8
26. Id. at 713.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 679.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 678.
33. Id. at 685-86.
34. Id. at 687-700. "Customary international law" is law based on consistent state action taken
out of a sense of obligation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (8th ed. 2004).
35. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 687-700.
36. Id. at 7oo.
37. Id. (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, 214-15 (1895)).
38. Id. at 70i-o8.
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After its thorough inquiry into the practices of nations and scholarly
works, the Court concluded:
This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears
to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day, by the general
consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any
express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of
international law, founded on considerations of humanity to a poor
and indnstrious [sic] order of men, and of the mutual convenience of
belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and
supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their
peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from
capture as prize of war. 9
Having concluded that customary international law proscribed the
capture of peaceful fishing vessels, the Court turned to the final issue
before it: whether the Court could enforce this rule of customary
international law against the executive branch."g The Court's holding with
respect to this particular issue is arguably the most well known passage
from The Paquete Habana, stating: "luternational [sic] law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination.""
Once the Court concluded that customary international law "is a
part of our law" and that the Court must administer it, the Court had
little choice but to enforce the rule of customary international law against
the Executive.42 The Court therefore held that the capture of the Paquete
Habana was invalid because it was in violation of customary
international law.43
Had Justice Gray ended the majority's opinion there, The Paquete
Habana would arguably provide precedent for the enforcement of
customary international law against the Executive. But he did not.
Justice Gray went on to point out that "there are expressions of Chief
Justice Marshall [in Brown] which, taken by themselves, might seem
inconsistent with the position above maintained of the duty of a prize
court to take judicial notice of a rule of international law."' By
conceding this perceived vulnerability, a vulnerability based on a
misunderstanding of Brown, Justice Gray unnecessarily weakened The
39. Id. at 708.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 700.
42. Although Justice Gray made no reference to it, the Court's conclusion that the capture was
invalid seems inescapable in light of the Take Care Clause, which charges the President with the
responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONsT. art. 1I, § 3, cl. 4.
43. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 714.
44. Id. at 710.
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Paquete Habana's central holding that the Executive is subject to
customary international law.
In his dissent from The Paquete Habana, Chief Justice Fuller argued
that customary international law did not prohibit the capture of enemy
fishing vessels, and that even if it did, the Court could not revise
executive action "taken in the ordinary exercise of discretion in the
conduct of war."45 According to Fuller, "exemption from the rigors of
war is in the control of the Executive. He is bound by no immutable rule
on the subject. It is for him to apply, or to modify, or to deny altogether
such immunity as may have been usually extended." 6 The only case that
Fuller relied on in his dissent from The Paquete Habana was Brown.47
B. BROWN V. UNITED STATES
Like The Paquete Habana, Brown occurred against the backdrop of
war; however, in the case of Brown, it was the War of 1812,
approximately ninety years before the Paquete Habana ever set sail.48 A
British company chartered the Emulous, a cargo ship, to carry cargo
including pine timber, from Savannah, Georgia to Plymouth, England.49
After the cargo was put on board, the Emulous set sail but was stopped
shortly thereafter when the United States placed an embargo against
Britain." Later that month, the owner of the Emulous and an agent of
the British company that chartered the ship agreed that it should proceed
to New Bedford, Massachusetts, where the ship's owners resided.'
While the Emulous was in transit to New Bedford, the United States
declared war on Great Britain and the War of 1812 began.52 Once the
ship arrived in New Bedford, the pine timber remained aboard the ship
for several months but was eventually removed. 3 Realizing that the
embargo against Britain might last quite a while and that the cargo could
sit in New Bedford indefinitely, an American agent of the British
company arranged to sell the cargo, including the timber, to another
American citizen, Armitz Brown. 4 What happened next is what
prompted the claim in Brown. Although the owner of the Emulous, John
Delano, advised the agent of the British company to sell the cargo, once
the agent did so, Delano contacted an attorney for the United States and
45. Id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 720.
47. Id. at 715-21.
48. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) i1o, 121 (I814).
49. Id.
50. Id. at Ii1, 121.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 121.
53. Id. at 1il, 121.
54. Id. at 121-22.
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had him file a libel against the cargo on behalf of the United States, John
Delano, "and all other persons concerned."55
The District Court of Massachusetts dismissed the libel, but the
circuit court reversed and held that the pine timber was "enemy property
forfeited to the United States.", 6 Armitz Brown appealed the circuit
court's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. 7
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Marshall described the
issues before the Court as (i) whether the confiscation of enemy
property found on U.S. land was a "necessary consequence of the
declaration of war"; and (2) if not, whether there was any legislative act
authorizing the confiscation of enemy property."
In addressing the first issue, whether the declaration of war
confiscated enemy property ex proprio vigore, Chief Justice Marshall
adopted an approach similar to the approach Justice Gray utilized
decades later in The Paquete Habana; he looked first to the practice of
foreign nations, and then turned to the works of jurists for confirmation
of the international practice. 9
Marshall concluded that there existed a "universal practice of
forbearing to seize and confiscate debts and credits."" After surveying
the works of jurists including Bynkershoek, Vattel, and Chitty for
evidence of the current customary international law regarding
confiscation of enemy property,6' Marshall concluded that "[t]he modern
rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to an
enemy and found in the country at the commencement of war, ought not
to be immediately confiscated. ' '6' He also noted that most of the
commercial treaties between the United States and other nations
included stipulations for the right to withdraw property upon the
commencement of hostilities.6"
Marshall finally concluded that if it was not the customary practice
to confiscate enemy property immediately upon declaring war, and if the
works of jurists and existing treaties also indicated that it was not
customary to confiscate enemy property upon declaring war, the
declaration of war could not possibly act as a confiscation of property, ex
proprio vigore.64 However, Marshall made pains to assert that although
55. Id. at III, 121.
56. Id. at 122.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id.; The Paquete Habana, i75 U.S. at 686-707.
6o. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 123.
61. Id. at 124-25.
62. Id. at 125.
63. ld.
64. Id.
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the declaration of war did not itself act as a confiscation of enemy
property, the "sovereign" did have the right to do just that.6' Because the
legislature had not chosen to exercise the right, the confiscation of the
pine timber was invalid.66
In his dissent from Brown, Justice Story took a much more pro-
Executive stance than Chief Justice Marshall. 6 Justice Story took the
position that the Executive did not need the express authority of
Congress to exercise the right to confiscate enemy property."' However,
he was still careful to point out that although, in his view, the Executive
could unilaterally exercise a right conferred by customary international
law, such as the right to confiscate enemy property, the Executive could
not unilaterally violate a duty imposed by customary international law.6"
II. THE MISINTERPRETATION OF BROWN V. UNITED STATES
Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown in his dissent from
The Paquete Habana was manifold. First, Fuller misread the passage
from Brown regarding the discretion of the sovereign to "follow[] or
abandon[]"'" the modern usage "at his will,"7' the passage upon which he
premised so much of his dissent, to mean that the Executive had
discretion to abandon customary international law. In fact, when
Marshall referred to the discretion of the sovereign in Brown, he was
referring to the legislature. Second, Fuller misunderstood what type of
discretion Chief Justice Marshall was discussing in Brown. Fuller misread
the above-mentioned passage to mean that the Executive could violate
customary international law. When Marshall referred to the sovereign's
discretion to follow or abandon the modern usage, he in fact meant that
the sovereign could choose to exercise a right conferred by customary
international law, not that the sovereign could violate a duty imposed by
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at i29.
67. Id. at 149 (Story, J., dissenting) ("[T]he executive must have all the right [sic] of modern
warfare vested in him, to be exercised in his sound discretion, or he can have none."). But see id. at 128
(majority opinion) ("It is urged that, in executing the laws of war, the executive may seize and the
Courts condemn all property which, according to the modem law of nations, is subject to
confiscation .... This argument must assume for its basis the position that modern usage constitutes a
rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not through the sovereign power.
This position is not allowed.").
68. Id. at 149 (Story, J., dissenting).
[The majority] seems tacitly to concede, that, by virtue of the declaration of war, the
executive would have a right to seize enemies' property .... [I]f the argument be correct,
that the power to make captures on land or water must be expressly called into exercise by
congress, before the executive can, even after war, enforce a capture and condemnation, it
will be very difficult to support the concession.
Id. at 15I.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
71. Id.
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customary international law.7" Because Fuller failed to appreciate the
distinction between the discretion to exercise a right and the obligation
to adhere to a duty, he mistakenly believed that the majority position in
The Paquete Habana was irreconcilable with Brown. The fact that Justice
Gray, writing for the majority, shared much of Chief Justice Fuller's
misinterpretation of Brown is mainly notable because it prevented him
from adequately responding to Fuller's dissent.
A. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER'S MISINTERPRETATION OF BROWN V.
UNITED STATES
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent from The Paquete Habana, which relies
heavily on Brown, actually turns Brown on its head. While Brown stands
for the proposition that the legislature must make a clear statement
before the Executive may exercise a right created by customary
international law, Chief Justice Fuller relied on language in Brown to
support his argument that the Executive could unilaterally violate a duty
imposed by customary international law.73
i. The Executive as the "Sovereign"
Chief Justice Fuller specifically relied upon the passage in Brown in
which Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will. The rule, like others precepts of morality, of humanity and even of
wisdom, is addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it
cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, yet it may be
disregarded. The rule is, in its nature, flexible. It is subject to infinite
modification. It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on
political considerations which may continually vary."74
Chief Justice Fuller clearly believed the portion of Brown mentioning the
"sovereign" referred to the Executive because, in his dissent from The
Paquete Habana, he relied upon this portion of Brown to argue that the
Court could not revise executive action.75
However, the second question presented in Brown was whether the
legislature authorized the confiscation of enemy property during the War
of 1812.76 The question itself presumes that in order for the right of
confiscation to be exercised, even during war, the Executive must have
legislative authorization. In Brown, Marshall explicitly stated, "[i]t
appears to the Court, that the power of confiscating enemy property is in
72. See id.
73. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 720 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 715 (quoting Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) i1o, 121 (1814)).
75. Id. ("I am unable to conclude that there is any such established international rule, or that this
court can properly revise action which must be treated as having been takeu [sic] in the ordinary
exercise of discretion in the couduct [sic] of war.").
76. Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 123 ("The questions to be decided by this court are:... Is there
any legislative act which authorized such seizure and condemnation?").
[Vol. 6o: 1 49
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the legislature, and that the legislature has not yet declared its will to
confiscate property which was within our territory at the declaration of
war."77 Therefore, Fuller's interpretation of Brown as supporting
executive discretion is squarely at odds with its holding.
Some may point to Marshall's references to the "sovereign's" will as
"his" will as evidence that Marshall was in fact referring to the President
when he discussed the "sovereign's" right to "follow[] or abandon[]" the
modern usage at will. 8 However, as other commentators have explained,
Marshall's references to the sovereign's will as "his" will can be
attributed to the fact that when he wrote the Brown decision, the vast
majority of sovereign's throughout the world were in fact individual
males.79 Because the case dealt with international law, Marshall utilized
the term most appropriate for the majority of sovereigns
internationally.' The United States was a minority in that its "sovereign"
was the legislature.
The dissent in Brown further demonstrates that there is no reading
of Brown supporting Chief Justice Fuller's interpretation of the
"sovereign" as the Executive. In his dissent from Brown, Justice Story
took a much more pro-Executive stance than Chief Justice Marshall did
writing for the majority.8' Justice Story took the position that the
Executive did not need the express authority of Congress to exercise the
right to confiscate enemy property.5s Story saw the right to capture
enemy property as a right incidental to the right to execute war, and thus
a right vested in the Executive by the legislature's declaration of war."3
Despite Story's pro-Executive approach, he was still careful to point out
77. Id. at 129.
78. Id. at 128 ("The rule, like other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is
addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him without
obloquy, yet it may be disregarded." (emphasis added)).
79. Dodge, supra note 14, at 200.
8o. Id.
8I. Compare Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 149 (Story, J., dissenting) ("[T]he executive must have
all the rights of modern warfare vested in him, to be exercised in his sound discretion, or he can have
none."), with id. at 128 (majority opinion) ("It is urged that, in executing the laws of war, the executive
may seize and the Courts condemn all property which, according to the modem law of nations, is
subject to confiscation .... This argument must assume for its basis the position that modem usage
constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not through the
sovereign power. This position is not allowed.").
82. Id. at 151 (Story, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] seems tacitly to concede, that, by virtue of
the declaration of war, the executive would have a right to seize enemies' property .... [I]f the
argument be correct, that the power to make captures on land or water must be expressly called into
exercise by congress, before the executive can, even after war, enforce a capture and condemnation, it
will be very difficult to support the concession.").
83. Id. at 143 ("In respect to the goods of an enemy found within the dominions of a belligerent
power, the right of confiscation is most amply admitted .... "); id. at 152 ("[T]he power to carry the
war into effect, gives every incidental power which the law of nations authorizes and approves in a
state of war.").
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that although, in his view, the Executive could exercise a right under
customary international law without express congressional authority, the
Executive could not unilaterally violate a duty imposed by customary
international law.8" Regarding the duties imposed by customary
international law upon the Executive, Story stated, "[the Executive]
cannot lawfully transcend the rules of warfare established among
civilized nations. He cannot lawfully exercise powers or authorize
proceedings which the civilized world repudiates and disclaims.""' Given
that Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Brown required express
congressional authority to exercise a right under customary international
law, and that even Justice Story's pro-Executive dissent asserted that the
Executive could not unilaterally violate customary international law,
Chief Justice Fuller's reliance on Brown for his assertion that the
Executive can unilaterally violate customary international law is clearly
misplaced.
2. The Executive's Right to Violate Customary International Law
and the Right/Duty Distinction
Chief Justice Fuller's second mistake in interpreting Brown was his
belief that Brown stood for the proposition that the sovereign could
violate customary international law at will. Fuller, discussing the Court's
authority to review executive action, stated, "I am unable to
conclude.., that this court can properly revise action which must be
treated as having been taken in the ordinary course of discretion."86
Relying on the language in Brown where Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"[t]he usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his
will, 8 ' Fuller argued, "[customary international law] is for him to apply,
or to modify, or to deny altogether such immunity as may have been
usually extended."8
However, the language from Brown that Chief Justice Fuller relied
upon actually referred to the authority to exercise the right to confiscate
enemy property under customary international law, not the authority to
violate customary international law. Marshall was arguing that the
customary international law giving the sovereign the right to confiscate
property did not operate independently of the sovereign, but that the
sovereign" must choose to exercise that right.
The context of Marshall's statement within the Brown opinion
supports this conclusion. Marshall made the statement that the sovereign
could follow or abandon the usage at his will in rebuttal to the dissent's
84. Id. at 153.
85. Id.
86. The Paquete Habana, i75 U.S. 677, 715 (19oo) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 715 (quoting Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128).
88. Id. at 720.
89. The legislature, as explained in Part II.A.i, supra.
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contention that the declaration of war acted as confiscation of enemy
property, ex proprio vigore. ° According to Marshall, the dissent asserted,
"in executing the laws of war, the executive may seize and the Courts
condemn all the property which, according to the modern law of nations,
is subject to confiscation."9' Marshall rejected this contention stating:
This argument must assume for its basis the position that modern
usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its
own force .... This usage is a guide which the sovereign follows or
abandons at his will.9'
Put in the proper context, it becomes clear that Marshall was not
asserting that the Executive could adhere to or abandon customary
international law at will. In fact, he was arguing just the opposite, that the
rule of customary international law did not act "by its own force," and
that the Executive therefore needed Congressional authority in order to
exercise the right and set customary international law into motion.93
Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown underscores an
important distinction between Brown and The Paquete Habana. In
Brown, the Court conceded that the Executive had the right to confiscate
enemy property, and only addressed the question of how that right could
be exercised, i.e., with or without the legislature's authorization.94 In
contrast, in The Paquete Habana, the Court addressed the question of
whether customary international law prohibited the confiscation, thereby
imposing a duty limiting the Executive's power to confiscate.9" The
right/duty distinction follows naturally from the holding in Brown; if, as
the Court said in Brown, the Executive cannot exercise a right conferred
by customary international law without express authority from Congress,
surely the Executive cannot violate a duty imposed by customary
international law without express congressional authority.6
Some of the early debates surrounding executive authority illustrate
that Chief Justice Marshall's contemporaries, no matter what their
political persuasion, understood that customary international law
imposed duties upon the Executive. In his Letters of Pacificus, Alexander
9o . Brown, 12 U.S (8 Cranch) at 147 (Story, J., dissenting) ("The title of the enemy is not by war
divested, but remains in proprio vigore, until a hostile seizure and possession has impaired his title.").
9 i . Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 128-29 ("[Tjhe question, what shall be done with enemy property in our country ... is
proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary.").
94. Id. at 123 ("The questions to be decided by this court are: ist. May enemy's property, found
on land at the commencement of hostilities, be seized and condemned as a necessary consequence of
the declaration of war? 2d. Is there any legislative act which authorizes such seizure and
condemnation?").
95. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (19oo) ("We are then brought to the consideration of
the question whether, upon the facts appearing in these records, the fishing smacks were subject to
capture by the armed vessels of the United States.").
96. Dodge, supra note 14, at 201.
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Hamilton, a staunch Federalist and a proponent of a strong executive
branch, argued for plenary executive power.97 Hamilton viewed the grant
of "executive power" to the President in Article II, section i of the
United States Constitution as a grant of "general" executive power, and
the enumerated powers in Article II, section 2 as examples of, not
limitations on, that general executive power." However, despite
Hamilton's view that the Constitution vested the Executive with plenary
power, he still recognized that the Executive had a duty to adhere to
customary international law, or in the parlance of the time "the law of
nations."' For example, Hamilton stated, "[t]he executive is charged
with the execution of all laws, the law of nations, as well as the municipal
law."'" Although Hamilton felt that the Executive's interpretation of
treaty obligations and obligations under customary international law
should be given great weight because the Executive served "[a]s the
organ of intercourse between the nation and foreign nations,' .... he still
acknowledged that customary international law cabined executive
authority. When describing the relationship between the Executive and
customary international law, Hamilton stated, "it belongs to the
'executive power' to do whatever else the law of nations, co-operating
with the treaties of the country, enjoin in the intercourse of the United
States with foreign powers.""
James Madison, a staunch Republican and opponent of a strong
centralized government, responded to the Letters of Pacificus in his
Letters of Helvidius." Unlike Hamilton, Madison believed that the
executive powers included only those powers explicitly vested in the
Executive, i.e., only those executive powers enumerated in the
Constitution. 14 Madison declared that the Constitution itself, via
enumeration of powers, defined executive power and legislative power.0 5
Despite their differing opinions on the scope of executive authority
under the Constitution, there was at least one point on which Madison
and Hamilton agreed: the duty of the Executive to abide by customary
international law. Quoting Hamilton's Letters of Pacificus, Madison
stated "'[t]he executive is charged with the execution of all laws, the laws
of nations as well as the municipal law which recognizes and adopts those
97. Alexander Hamilton, The Letters of Pacificus, in JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST, ON
THE NEW CONSTITUTION 406, 407 (Glazier, Masters & Smith 1842).
98. Id. at 407-o8.
99. Id. at 4o8.
Ioo. Id.
iot. Id. at 407.
io2. Id. at 410.
103. James Madison, The Letters of Helvidius, in JAMES MADISON Er AL., supra note 97, at 432, 432.
104. Id. at 435.
105. Id. at 435, 440.
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laws..'.... Madison professed his agreement with this statement, declaring,
"[this] sentence is a truth."'" The debate between James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton regarding executive power, and their consensus
regarding the Executive's duty to abide by customary international law,
demonstrates that whichever stance one adopted-the plenary executive
power approach, or the enumerated executive power approach-it was
universally accepted that customary international law bound the
Executive. It is therefore extremely unlikely that Marshall, a
contemporary of Hamilton and Madison, advocated the Executive's
authority to violate customary international law in Brown. °
B. JUSTICE GRAY'S MISINTERPRETATION OF BROWN V. UNITED STATES
Chief Justice Fuller's dissent from The Paquete Habana, and his
misinterpretation of Brown, would have little importance if it were not
for the fact that Justice Gray, writing for the majority in The Paquete
Habana, seemed to share Chief Justice Fuller's belief that there might be
come inconsistency between Brown and The Paquete Habana. Because
he shared Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown, Justice Gray
failed to effectively respond to Fuller's dissent from The Paquete
Habana.
Justice Gray stated that there were portions of Brown that "might
seem inconsistent with the position above maintained, of the duty of a
prize court to take judicial notice of a rule of international law."'"
However, in Brown, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, did
take notice of customary international law when he concluded, "[t]he
modern rule then would seem to be, that tangible property belonging to
an enemy ... ought not to be immediately confiscated ....
It is really Justice Gray's brief concession to apparent
inconsistencies between Brown and The Paquete Habana that injected
vulnerability into The Paquete Habana's force. If Justice Gray had
interpreted Brown in a manner suggested by this Note, he might have
crafted a more effective rejoinder of Chief Justice Fuller's dissent."'
III. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL, THE EXECUTIVE, AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Chief Justice Marshall's jurisprudence, his personal views, and his
experiences in the arena of international affairs, all indicate that he
io6. Id. at 443 (quoting Hamilton, supra note 97).
io7. Dodge, supra note 14, at 2o0 n.s88.
1o8. BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL: A STUDY OF FIRSt
PRINCIPLES 6 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2006) (I939).
109. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,710 (1900).
iJo. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814).
i J i. Dodge, supra note 14, at 201.
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believed that customary international law bound the Executive.
Marshall's jurisprudence as Chief Justice illustrated his belief that it was
important for the United States to follow international law if the United
States was to establish itself as a member of the international community.
He was careful to apply customary international law "as often as
questions of right depending upon it [were] duly presented, .... in order to
establish the United States, then a tyro in the international arena, as one
of the civilized nations of the world. For example, in the prize case The
Venus, Marshall applied customary international law and expressed his
belief that customary international law "is a law founded on the great
and immutable principles of equity and natural justice."'"3 In The
Nereide, discussed further below, Marshall concluded that if Congress
wished to violate customary international law, it would have to do so via
express legislation, again demonstrating his hesitance to diverge from the
tenets of customary international law."4 In the landmark case, Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, Marshall established the eminence of customary
international law relative to domestic law, stating "an Act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."'"5 Marshall's decisions as the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court depict a man who believed it was vitally
important for the United States to adhere to customary international law
and underscore the unlikeliness of Chief Justice Fuller's position that
Marshall's opinion in Brown was an assertion of executive discretion to
violate customary international law.
Chief Justice Marshall's other decisions regarding executive
authority further undermine Fuller's contention that Brown stands for
executive discretion to violate customary international law. In several
wartime cases, Marshall demonstrated his belief that much of the war
power resided in the legislature. For example, in The Nereide, another
case arising from the War of 1812, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
If it be the will of the government to apply.., any rule respecting
captures ... the government will manifest that will by passing an act
for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land."
6
Like The Paquete Habana, The Nereide involved the capture of an enemy
vessel at sea."7 However, The Nereide differed from Brown and The
Paquete Habana in that it involved the capture of an enemy ship
112. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700; ZIEGLER, supra note io8, at 29-30.
113. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253,297 (1814).
114. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388,423 (1815).
115. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, i18 (1804).
s16. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423 (emphasis added).
117. Id. at415.
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chartered by a neutral. "8 In The Nereide, the Court interpreted a treaty
between Spain and the United States, as well as customary international
law, to decide the question of whether the goods on board the Nereide
acquired the status of enemy goods by virtue of being aboard an enemy
ship."9 The Court concluded that in the absence of a contrary
congressional statement, the United States had a duty to restore the
goods of a neutral under customary international law.' 0 Chief Justice
Marshall's holding in The Nereide therefore illustrated his view that in
the face of congressional silence, customary international law is binding
upon the courts and the Executive.
In another wartime case, Talbot v. Seeman, Chief Justice Marshall
again communicated his belief that many war powers reside in the
legislature, not the Executive. ' Talbot involved the capture of the
Amelia, a vessel from Hamburg, by the French.' Hamburg and France
were not belligerents at the time of the capture and, therefore, the Court
concluded that under the law of nations, the Amelia did not convert to a
French vessel upon capture, but remained a vessel of Hamburg.'2 3 The
Amelia, now commanded and manned by the French captors, was in turn
captured by a U.S. warship, the Constitution.' 4 The question before the
Court was whether Captain Talbot, the captain of the Constitution, had
the right to seize the Amelia, and if so, whether he was entitled to a
salvage fee for "saving" the Amelia from French condemnation.'25 In
deciding the first question, Marshall looked exclusively to acts of
Congress to determine whether Talbot had a right to confiscate the
Amelia, given that the U.S. and France were engaged in hostilities6
Marshall explained his approach thus: "[t]he whole powers of war being
by the Constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of
that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry......
Together, The Nereide and Talbot demonstrate that Marshall believed
that Congress, not the Executive, wielded "[t]he whole powers of war. '..2
Therefore, Fuller's interpretation of Brown, another Marshall opinion, as
I8. Id. at 418.
119. Id. at 418-I9.
120. Id. at 418 ("The rule that the goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are prize of
war, and that the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are to be restored, is believed to be
a part of the original law of nations, as generally, perhaps universally, acknowledged.").
121. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) i (i8OI).
122. Id. at 5.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 5, 9. France and the United States were engaged in hostilities at the time. Id. at i.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 19 ("It was not contemplated by any act of congress that our vessels should capture
Hamburgh vessels.").
127. Id. at 28.
128. Id.
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supporting executive discretion in war-related matters is simply
implausible.
Although he may not have referred to it as such, Chief Justice
Marshall also recognized the right/duty distinction. In his personal
correspondence, Marshall wrote "[the law of nations] forms, independent
of compact, a rule of action by which the sovereignties of the civilized
world consent to be governed. It prescribes what one nation may
do ... and what, of consequence, another may and ought to permit.' 29
Marshall's references to what a nation "may do" (a right) under
customary international law, and what a nation "ought to do" (a duty)
under customary international law illustrates that he perceived that
customary international law both conveyed rights and imposed duties.
Contrasting a case such as Brown, where Marshall concluded that
customary international law conferred a right, with cases in which
Marshall concluded that customary international law imposed a duty,
further illustrates his understanding of the right/duty distinction. In The
Nereide, Marshall concluded that customary international law imposed a
duty to return property belonging to a neutral, but carried on an enemy
vessel.'30  Chief Justice Marshall applied this rule of customary
international law without any reference to legislative or executive
authorization.'' In fact, Justice Marshall applied the rule because
Congress had said nothing at all, and in the face of Congressional silence,
customary international law served as the default rule of law.'32 The
Nereide stands in contrast to Brown, wherein Marshall refused the
Executive's ability to exercise a right conferred by customary
international law without explicit congressional authority.'33 The two
cases, and Marshall's different approach to each, therefore serve as
examples of the right/duty distinction. When customary international
duty confers a right, as in Brown, the legislature must choose to exercise
that right. However, when customary international law imposes a duty,
as in The Nereide, the rule operates ex proprio vigore. It is unlikely that
Chief Justice Fuller would have relied so heavily on Brown, a "right"
case, in The Paquete Habana, a "duty" case, had he fully appreciated the
right/duty distinction. His failure to appreciate this difference further
undermines his reliance on Brown.
Chief Justice Marshall was immersed in international law
throughout his career as a political leader, an attorney, and a judge. For
129. 3 STATE PAPERS AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE ACCESSION OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON TO THE PRESIDENCY, EXHIBITING A COMPLETE VIEW OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS
SINCE THAT TIME 224-25 (1815) (emphasis added).
13o. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418-i9 (1815).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 423.
133. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) io, 128 (1814).
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example, Marshall was a member of the envoy President John Adams
sent to France in 1797 in an effort to avert war with France."3 The
delegation was ultimately unable to achieve its objective, returning to the
United States after French officials attempted to illicit bribes from the
delegation in what is known as the XYZ Affair. '35 However, John
Marshall's participation undoubtedly increased his understanding of
international affairs and diplomacy. President Adams also appointed
John Marshall as his Secretary of State in I800.136 During Marshall's
tenure as Secretary of State, he negotiated multiple international
agreements including neutrality agreements and peace treaties with
France and Britain.'37 Given Marshall's extensive experience in foreign
affairs prior to joining the Supreme Court, it is unsurprising that he
manifested a strong belief in the binding nature of international law in
his jurisprudence as Chief Justice.
As a young attorney, Marshall argued many cases involving rights
under international law. Marshall, a Virginian, defended Virginians
against the claims of British creditors in the landmark case Ware v.
Hylton.""8 In Ware, Marshall argued to uphold Virginia laws confiscating
the debts of British subjects.'39 The Virginia debtors, represented by
Marshall, hoped to avoid collection of their debts by asserting the
validity of Virginia laws. 4 ' Marshall relied heavily on customary
international law, arguing that Virginia, as a sovereign nation, had a right
to confiscate private debts under customary international law.'4 ' Some
might argue that Marshall's position in Ware is inconsistent with his
position in Brown; in Ware Marshall argued for confiscation of enemy
debts, but in Brown, he decided to invalidate confiscation of enemy
goods. However, the two cases are reconcilable. As explained above, in
Brown, Marshall did not deny the sovereign's right to confiscate enemy
property; he only stated that the sovereign must choose to exercise that
right. "' In Ware, Marshall argued that Virginia, as a sovereign state, had
the right to confiscate enemy debts, and had chosen to do so.' Although
Marshall did not prevail in Ware,'" his experience in that case, as well as
his experiences as a diplomat and political leader, illustrate that he was
134. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835, at IO-iI (1997).
135. 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 256-59 (i916).
136. JOHNSON, supra note 134.
137. Id. at Ii.
138. Id. at 11-12; 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) i9 (I8oi).
139. Id. at I1;3 U.S. (3 Dali.) at 214-15.
14o. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Daln.) at 214-15.
141. Id. at 210.
142. See supra Part I.B.
143. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199-200.
144. Id. at 284-85.
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intimately connected with international affairs before becoming Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in i8oi.' 45
IV. THE MODERN RELEVANCE OF BROWN V. UNITED STATES AND THE
PAQUETE HABANA
Chief Justice Fuller's mistaken reliance on Marshall's opinion in
Brown to support his argument that the Executive may unilaterally
violate customary international law would be no more than a historical
curiosity if the mistake were limited to The Paquete Habana. However,
Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown lives on. Several recent
cases, briefs, and memos addressing executive power in the War on
Terrorism echo Fuller's argument and construe Marshall's words in
Brown to support executive authority to violate customary international
law. For example, in a memo written by Professor John Yoo, then a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special
Counsel to the President (Yoo-Delahunty Memo), Yoo and Delahunty
advised William Haynes, General Counsel for the Department of
Defense, that "[i]t is well accepted that the political branches have ample
authority to override customary international law."' 46 The Yoo-
Delahunty Memo advised the Department of Defense and the President
that neither the War Crimes Act of I996' 47 nor the Geneva Conventions
applied to alleged Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay."8 Furthermore, the memo advised the President and the
Department of Defense that "customary international law [regarding
prisoners of war] does not bind the President."'4 9 Yoo and Delahunty
adopted Fuller's interpretation of Brown, and cited the same passage
from Brown that Chief Justice Fuller cited in his dissent from The
Paquete Habana:'50
Yoo and Delahunty also translated this passage from Brown into
what they called "twenty-first century words" and restated it as,
"overriding customary international law may prove to be a bad idea, or
be subject to criticism, but there is no doubt that the government has the
power to do it."''5' Their "translation" of the passage from Brown
illustrates the fact that they shared Chief Justice Fuller's mistaken belief
that Brown stands for the proposition that the Executive can unilaterally
violate customary international law.
145. JOHNSON, supra note 134, at io, II.
146. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note i8, at 36.
147. is U.S.C. § 2401 (2oo6).
148. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note I8, at 36.
149. Id. at 39.
15o. Id. at 36; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 715 (i9oo) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) iio, 128 (1814)).
ii. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note iM, at 36.
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William Haynes, the recipient of the Yoo-Delahunty memo, sent a
memo to Alberto Gonzales, then Counsel to the President, adopting the
same misinterpretation of Brown that Yoo and Delahunty set forth in
their memo.'5 2 Haynes cited the same passage from Brown to support his
position that the political branches could override customary
international law.'
53
This mistaken interpretation of Brown worked its way up the ranks,
and in June of 2002, President George W. Bush signed an order outlining
the treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees, explicitly adopting
Yoo and Delahunty's legal conclusions.'54 The fact that contemporary
jurists have adopted Chief Justice Fuller's misinterpretation of Brown
demonstrates that Chief Justice Fuller's dissent is not just an interesting
historical artifact. It is an insidious misrepresentation of Brown, a case
that in reality stands for the proposition that the Executive cannot
unilaterally violate customary international law.
CONCLUSION
The Paquete Habana and Brown serve the important role of
illustrating how customary international law historically cabined
executive authority. However, both the majority and dissenting opinions
in The Paquete Habana unnecessarily weakened the case's effectiveness
as a limit on executive power when they referenced passages of Brown
that they believed were inconsistent with the Court's holding in The
Paquete Habana. Both Chief Justice Fuller, in his dissent from The
Paquete Habana, and Gray, in the majority opinion, misunderstood
Brown. Fuller misunderstood Brown as supporting the Executive's right
to violate customary law. However, the language of the Brown opinion,
the prevailing views regarding executive power at the time Chief Justice
Marshall wrote Brown, and Marshall's jurisprudence all indicate that
Brown in fact stands for the opposite proposition-that the Executive
cannot unilaterally violate customary international law.
152. Bybee, supra note x8, at 34.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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